Mexico’s religious context is diverse and complex because of its mestizo origin. The popular religiosity predominant in the country is considered a religious syncretism characterised by some salient and frequent aspects: Sense of ritual, mysticism, sacrifice, festivity and community. These elements are confirmed as outstanding traits of Mexican religiosity because they give cohesion to a very broad and plural religiosity and interact in many religious expressions. This brief analysis also reveals that there exist potential possibilities to study the process of (...) contextualisation of Evangelical faith in Mexico using these five relevant features of the context as the framework of reference. (shrink)

The scientific approach to these social conglomerates implies the assumption of a systemic and anti-essentialist posture that considers the complexity of the social weave. In this article the process of interpreting these agricultural communities from the phenomenological perspective is consid..

Despite organizational ethical training programs, some employees still engage in unethical behavior. As such, organizational researchers have sought to examine why employees engage in unethical behavior and whether interventions can improve ethical misconduct. While some instruments measure moral development or ethical/unethical behaviors toward the organization, this study utilized a unique scale which evaluates perceptions of ethical misconduct (PEMS). Data from a large Midwestern university, a large Southeastern university, and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk were used in the analyses. An exploratory and confirmatory (...) factor analyses were used in the creation of the PEMS. To examine the validity of the scale, the PEMS was correlated to scales which measure Dark Triad traits and Counterproductive Work Behaviors (CWBs). Findings showed a significant positive correlation between the PEMS and both scales. The results also show that the PEMS mediates the relationship between psychopathy and CWBs. (shrink)

IntroductionCardiology is characterized by its state-of-the-art biomedical technology and the predominance of Evidence-Based Medicine. This predominance makes it difficult for healthcare professionals to deal with the ethical dilemmas that emerge in this subspecialty. This paper is a first endeavor to empirically investigate the axiological foundations of the healthcare professionals in a cardiology hospital. Our pilot study selected, as the target population, cardiology personnel not only because of their difficult ethical deliberations but also because of the stringent conditions in which they (...) have to make them. Therefore, there is an urgent need to reconsider clinical ethics and Value-Based Medicine. This study proposes a qualitative analysis of the values and the virtues of healthcare professionals in a cardiology hospital in order to establish how the former impact upon the medical and ethical decisions made by the latter.ResultsWe point out the need for strengthening the roles of healthcare personnel as educators and guidance counselors in order to meet the ends of medicine, as well as the need for an ethical discernment that is compatible with our results, namely, that the ethical values developed by healthcare professionals stem from their life history as well as their professional education.ConclusionWe establish the kind of actions, communication skills and empathy that are required to build a stronger patient-healthcare professional relationship, which at the same time improves prognosis, treatment efficiency and therapeutic adhesion. (shrink)

Routley-Meyer type ternary relational semantics are defined for relevant logics including Routley and Meyer’s basic logic B plus the reductio rule and the disjunctive syllogism. Standard relevant logics such as E and R (plus γ ) and Ackermann’s logics of ‘strenge Implikation’ Π and Π ′ are among the logics considered.

The logic B+ is Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic. Wedefine the logics BK+ and BK′+ by adding to B+ the K rule and to BK+the characteristic S4 axiom, respectively. These logics are endowed witha relatively strong non-constructive negation. We prove that all the logicsdefined lack the K axiom and the standard paradoxes of consistency.

As it is well known, in the forties of the past century, Curry proved that in any logic S closed under Modus Ponens, uniform substitution of propositional variables and the Contraction Law, the naïve Comprehension axiom trivializes S in the sense that all propositions are derivable in S plus CA. Not less known is the fact that, ever since Curry published his proof, theses and rules weaker than W have been shown to cause the same effect as W causes. Among (...) these, the Contraction rule or the Modus Ponens axiom, for example, are to be noted. But, moreover, as Brady has proved, even the Generalized Modus Ponens axiom or the Generalized Contraction rule give rise to “Curry’s Paradox” under the same circumstances as W does. In some previous work by us, “weak relevant model structures” are defined on “weak relevant matrices” by generalizing Brady’s model structure MCL built upon Meyer’s Crystal matrix CL. We have proved that wr-ms only verify logics with the “depth relevance condition”. The aim of this paper is to show how to falsify gMPa and gRW in certain wr-ms. In particular, it will be shown that gMPa is falisfied in any wr-ms and gRW in any wr-ms verifying Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic B+. (shrink)

In his paper “Recent work in relevant logic”, Jago includes a section on Disjunctive Syllogism . The content of the section essentially consists of (a) a valuation of some work by Robles and Méndez on the topic as “not particularly interesting in itself”; (b) a statement establishing that “What would be interesting is to discover just how weak a relevant logic needs to be before disjunctive syllogism becomes inadmissible”. The main problem with this section of Jago’s paper on DS (...) is that the author is unaware of the recent important results on the topic. I show that (1) the valuation in (a) is groundless and (2) the ill-formulated problem in (b) is solved in the recent literature on relevant logics. (shrink)

The logic B$_{+}$ is Routley and Meyer's basic positive logic. The logic B$_{K+}$ is B$_{+}$ plus the $K$ rule. We add to B$_{K+}$ four intuitionistic-type negations. We show how to extend the resulting logics within the modal and relevance spectra. We prove that all the logics defined lack the K axiom.

The logic B+ is Routley and Meyer's basic positive logic. We show how to introduce a minimal intuitionistic negation and an intuitionistic negation in B+. The two types of negation are introduced in a wide spectrum of relevance logics built up from B+. It is proved that although all these logics have the characteristic paradoxes of consistency, they lack the K rule (and so, the K axioms).

Minimal Negation is defined within the basic positive relevance logic in the relational ternary semantics: B+. Thus, by defining a number of subminimal negations in the B+ context, principles of weak negation are shown to be isolable. Complete ternary semantics are offered for minimal negation in B+. Certain forms of reductio are conjectured to be undefinable (in ternary frames) without extending the positive logic. Complete semantics for such kinds of reductio in a properly extended positive logic are offered.

In a standard sense, consistency and paraconsistency are understood as the absence of any contradiction and as the absence of the ECQ (‘E contradictione quodlibet’) rule, respectively. The concepts of weak consistency (in two different senses) as well as that of F -consistency have been defined by the authors. The aim of this paper is (a) to define alternative (to the standard one) concepts of paraconsistency in respect of the aforementioned notions of weak consistency and F -consistency; (b) to define (...) the concept of strong paraconsistency; (c) to build up a series of strongly paraconsistent logics; (d) to define the basic constructive logic adequate to a rather weak sense of consistency. All logics treated in this paper are strongly paraconsistent. All of them are sound and complete in respect a modification of Routley and Meyer’s ternary relational semantics for relevant logics (no logic in this paper is relevant). (shrink)

The logic E4 is related to Brady’s BN4 in a similar way to which Anderson and Belnap’s logic of entailment E is related to their logic of the relevant implication R. In ‘A companion to Brady’s 4-valued relevant logic: the 4-valued logic of entailment E4’, quoted in this paper, three alternatives to BN4 and another three to E4 are summarily introduced in a couple of pages as the only alternatives containing Routley and Meyer’s basic logic B, provided some conditions are (...) fulfilled. The aim of this note is to prove BN4 and its three alternatives are the same logic up to some point, since they are functionally equivalent to each other, as it is the case with E4 and its three alternatives, which are also functionally equivalent to each other; to some extent, E4 is superior to BN4, since the latter is functionally included in the former, but not conversely. (shrink)

The Converse Ackermann Property is the unprovability of formulas of the form (A -> B) -> C when C does contain neither -> nor ¬. Intuitively, the CAP amounts to rule out the derivability of pure non-necessitive propositions from non-necessitive ones. A constructive negation of the sort historically defined by, e.g., Johansson is added to positive logics with the CAP in the spectrum delimited by Ticket Entailment and Dummett’s logic LC.

The well-known logic first degree entailment logic (FDE), introduced by Belnap and Dunn, is defined with |$\wedge $|⁠, |$\vee $| and |$\sim $| as the sole primitive connectives. The aim of this paper is to establish the lattice formed by the class of all 4-valued C-extending implicative expansions of FDE verifying the axioms and rules of Routley and Meyer’s basic logic B and its useful disjunctive extension B|$^{\textrm {d}}$|⁠. It is to be noted that Boolean negation (so, classical propositional logic) (...) is definable in the strongest element in the said class. (shrink)

Initial evaluation structures (IESs) currently proposed as the earliest detectors of affective stimuli (e.g., amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, or insula) are high-order structures (a) whose response latency cannot account for the first visual cortex emotion-related response (~80 ms), and (b) lack the necessary infrastructure to locally analyze the visual features that define emotional stimuli. Several thalamic structures accomplish both criteria. The lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), a first-order thalamic nucleus that actively processes visual information, with the complement of the thalamic reticular nucleus (...) (TRN) are proposed as core IESs. This LGN–TRN tandem could be supported by the pulvinar, a second-order thalamic structure, and by other extrathalamic nuclei. The visual thalamus, scarcely explored in affective neurosciences, seems crucial in early emotional evaluation. (shrink)

The logics BN4 and E4 can be considered as the 4-valued logics of the relevant conditional and (relevant) entailment, respectively. The logic BN4 was developed by Brady in 1982 and the logic E4 by Robles and Méndez in 2016. The aim of this paper is to investigate the implicative variants (of both systems) which contain Routley and Meyer’s logic B and endow them with a Belnap-Dunn type bivalent semantics.

This chapter contains sections titled: Acosta, José de (1539–1600) Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1810–84) Bello, Andrés (1781–1865) Bilbao, Francisco (1823–65) Bolkvar, Simón (1783–1830) Casas, Bartolomé de las (1484–1566) Caso, Antonio (1883–1946) Cruz, Sor Juana Inés de la (1651–95) da Costa, Newton Carneiro Affonso (b. 1929) Dussel, Enrique (b. 1934) Frondizi, Risieri (1910–83) Gaos, José (1900–69) González Prada, Manuel (1848–1918) Gracia, Jorge J. E. (b. 1942) Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979) Hostos, Eugenio Marka de (1839–1903) Ingenieros, José (1877–1925) Korn, Alejandro (...) (1860–1936) Lastarria, José Victorino (1817–88) Lemos, Miguel (1854–1917) Mariátegui, José Carlos (1895–1930) Martk, José (1853–95) Méndez Sierra, Justo (1848–1912) Mora, José Maria Luis (1794–1850) Miró Quesada, Francisco (b. 1918) Rabossi, Eduardo (1930–2005) Ramos, Samuel (1897–1959) Rodó, José Enrique (1872–1917) Romero, Francisco (1891–1962) Sahagún, Fray Bernardino de (1499–1590) Salazar Bondy, Augusto (1925–74) Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino (1811–88) Ofelia Schutte (b. 1945) Sepslveda, Juan Ginés de (ca. 1494–1573) Torretti, Roberto (b. 1930) Vasconcelos, José (1882–1959) Vaz Ferreira, Carlos (1872–1958) Villoro, Luis (b. 1922) Vitoria, Francisco de (ca. 1483–1546) Zea Aguilar, Leopoldo (1912–2004) Acknowledgment Further Reading. (shrink)

The 1996 European Summer Meeting of the Association of Symbolic Logic was held held the University of the Basque Country, at Donostia (San Se bastian) Spain, on July 9-15, 1996. It was organised by the Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and Information (ILCLI) and the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Sciences of the University of the Basque Coun try. It was supported by: the University of Pais Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unib ertsitatea, the Ministerio de Education y Ciencia (DGCYT), Hezkuntza Saila (...) (Eusko Jaurlaritza), Gipuzkoako Foru Aldundia, and Kuxta Fun dazioa. The main topics of the meeting were Model Theory, Proof Theory, Re cursion and Complexity Theory, Models of Arithmetic, Logic for Artifi cial Intelligence, Formal Semantics of Natural Language and Philosophy of Contemporary Logic. The Program Committee consisted of K. Ambos Spies (Heidelberg), J.L. Balcazar (Barcelona), J.E. Fenstad (Oslo), D. Israel (Stanford), H. Kamp (Stuttgart), R. Kaye (Birmingham), J.M. Larrazabal (San Sebastian), D. Lascar (Paris, chairman), A. Marcja (Firenze), G. Mints (Stanford), M. Otero (Madrid), S. Ronchi della Rocca (Torino), K. Segerberg (Uppsala) and L. Vega (Madrid). The organizing Committee consisted of X. Arrazola (San Sebastian), A. Arrieta (San Sebastian), R. Beneyeto (Valencia), B. Carrascal (San Se bastian), K. Korta (San Sebastian), J.M. Larrazabal (San Sebastian, chair man), J.C. Martinez (Barcelona), J.M. Mendez (Salamanca), F. Migura (Victoria) and J. Perez (Victoria). (shrink)

What is human reason, how did it arise, how is it connected to animal reason? In The Enigma of Reason (ER) Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber (2017) suggest that reason evolved driven by the need to support communication and coordination in small human groups. They contrast this to the idea that the function of reason is to enable humans to make better decisions and develop more accurate beliefs. After a summation of the ER argument, the theory is critiqued and two (...) of their assumptions -- that human cognition is based on massive modularity and that reason co-evolved with and is dependent upon language -- are challenged. Alternatives to these assumptions are presented from the perspective of pattern matching processes in neural dynamical systems, which it is asserted provides a more realistic approach to the functioning of the brain and mind. (shrink)

In 2004 Orlando Florida was hit with an almost unprecedented series of storms and hurricanes. Within two months, Hurricanes Charley, Frances, and Jeanne hit, and Hurricane Ivan made a near miss. Billions of dollars of damage resulted from these disasters, and several dozen lives were lost. It is tempting, in the case of extreme events, to either regard them as having no need of interpretation (that is, as simply given, material events shared by everyone), or as a kind of rare (...) window on the workings of a community.1 In this paper I want to examine the public construction of the meaning of the hurricane in Orlando, particularly as represented in reports at the time in the major newspaper, the Orlando Sentinel. I am especially interested in placemaking, that is, the ways in which places gain or fail to gain meaning in times of stress. I will suggest that opportunities for place-making were lost in Orlando because of the frame the events around Hurricane Charley were given. Hurricane Frances, though, was treated differently in the Orlando press, and the discourse around the hurricanes of 2004 provides a contrast to the kind of rhetorical response that circulated during the disastrous hurricane season of 2005. In the case of some disasters, community is reinforced, and the skills of place-making are exercised. The reaction to Hurricane Charley in Orlando, on the other hand, tended not to reinforce community, and tended not to contribute to place-making. While it is extremely difficult to measure sense of place or sense of community quantitatively, it is possible to make sense out of the interpretive tools people have at their disposal in a disaster. What comes out of all this, I think, is something I want to call “place-making imagination”. This is analogous to the 1 concept of “moral imagination” in ethics (Johnson). Our moral options extend as far as our imagination will allow. A person might boil the moral universe down to polarized options – fight or flight, kill or be killed, choose A or B – when in fact a more cultivated and aware imagination may have afforded other options, perhaps better ones than either polarized one.. (shrink)

William of Malmesbury's Regesta Regum Anglorum is one of the great histories of England, and one of the most important historical works of the European Middle Ages. Although its focus is national, its scope encompasses most of Western Europe and beyond, providing a full-scale account of the First Crusade. Apart from its formidable learning, it is characterized by narrative skill and entertainment value - with topics including unpowered flight and Henry I's zoo. This edition in the Oxford Medieval Texts series (...) is the first modern translation and edition. A full historical introduction is supplied in Volume II. (shrink)

As philosophers in the continental tradition have taken an interest in the return of religion, anthropologists and sociologists have rejected the once-dominant secularization thesis. Bradley B. Onishi connects these lines of thought to reveal how philosophy's religious investigations have enabled critical reflections on the category of the secular.

The question of how to distinguish between science and non-science, the so-called ' demarcation problem', is one of the most high-profile, perennial, and intractable issues in the philosophy of science. It is not merely a philosophical issue, however, since it has a significant bearing on practical policy questions and practical decisions. This essay develops a pragmatic approach to the demarcation problem: it argues that while there are some core principles that we can use in distinguishing between science and non-science, particular (...) judgments and decisions about something's scientific status depend, in part, on practical goals and concerns. (shrink)